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“The battle for us does not lie against crusted prejudice, but 
against the chaos of a new freedom. This chaos is our real problem.” 
In Drift and Mastery, Walter Lippmann clarified the target of attack 
that the progressive reformers had to concentrate their energy on. In 
1914, he believed that “the real problem” for his contemporary 
Americans was not a stifling authority restraining individuals’ liberty, 
but a chaos rampant in the modern United States. For Lippmann, it 
was the new freedom which gave birth to the chaos of the time. 
Such awareness of “the chaos of a new freedom” lead Lippmann to 
try to find an alternative to liberalism, which was, and still is, the 
most ingrained ideology in America.1)
1) Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current 
Unrest (New York, 1914), xx.
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Then, what was Lippmann’s alternative to liberalism? It was 
collectivism, or to put it in his more favorite words, “the promise of 
the trusts.” In the 1910s, he sought to formulate a political system 
which was similar to pluralism and corporatism, and labeled 
respectively as such by its defenders and critics. By using the terms 
of collectivism, what Lippmann imagined was a harmoniously ordered 
society in which all individuals united into groups in accordance with 
their interests, and participated in the political decision making 
process by exercising pressure through their listed-groups. When he 
said in Drift and Mastery that the trust movement was “doing what 
no conspirator or revolutionist could ever do,” Lippmann believed 
that collectivism would be the method to overcome “the chaos of a 
new freedom.” For that reason, Lippmann, after assuring that 
collectivism was already under way, advised the readers that they 
should firstly just keep waiting to see how the trust movement 
brought order out of chaos, then guide it to keep on the right track, 
rather than wasting energy to resist it.2)
Because of his concern over “the chaos of a new freedom” and 
hope for “the promise of trusts,” early Lippmann has been frequently 
described as a champion of collectivism. Even some previous studies 
depicted him as a corporate liberal, a collectivist-oriented progressive 
or a group thinker who has blind faith in technocratic planning. New 
Left historian R. Jeffery Lustig, for example, describes Lippmann as 
a pivotal thinker of “corporate liberalism.” Considering that “questions 
2) Ibid., 50; Theodore J. Lowi had termed the group-based political practice as 
“the Interest-Group liberalism,” see Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, 
Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York, 1969).
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about the character of organized social conditions lay at the center of 
the struggles that made up progressivism,” Lustig claims, it is natural 
that Lippmann, as with the progressives in general, did not see the 
problem as “having to do with structures of power but with 
disorganization and waste.” Such a rosy expectation of an organized 
society and the indifference to the existing power structure led 
Lippmann to be insensitive to the latent, sometimes explicit, threats 
of large corporations on individual freedom.3)
This mode of explanation is convincing enough that many 
defenders of Lippmann’s progressivism also partly accept it. While 
challenging the explanation, some historians, just like the New Left 
historians did, describe Lippmann as a corporate liberal. But the latter 
use the term in a more favorable sense. They portray Lippmann as a 
clear-eyed progressive thinker who keenly grasped the true meaning 
of collectivism in the early 20th century America. Intellectual historian 
Howard Brick includes Lippmann in a group of apostles of what he 
terms “social liberalism.” Believing the abolition of private property 
as a matter of fact, Brick says, Lippmann predicted that “the future 
lay with those willing to adopt consciously the tools of collectivism 
on behalf of promoting the public welfare.”4) These accounts provide 
3) R. Jeffrey Lustig, Corporate Liberalism: The Origins of Modern American 
Political Theory, 1890-1920 (California, 1982), 109, 210; see also Nancy Cohen, 
The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865-1914 (Chapel Hill, 2002); for 
a more orthodox Marx-Leninist point of view, see Brian Lloyd, Left Out: 
Pragmatism, Exceptionalism, and the Poverty of American Marxism, 1890-1922 
(Baltimore, 1997), ch. 7.
4) Howard Brick, Transcending Capitalism: Visions of a New Society in Modern 
American Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 19, 50; see also 
James Livingston, Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 
1850-1940 (Chapel Hill, 1994), chs. 3, 4, 9; Livingston argues that Lippmann 
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the reversed image of what the New Left school gave us. However, 
although the image of Lippmann has been transformed from a naïve 
dreamer to a foresighted visionary, the fact that he was a champion 
of collectivism remains intact.
But a group of intellectual historians, who came to recognize the 
significance of the philosophical influence of American pragmatism 
on Lippmann’s thought, argued that Drift and Mastery is a much 
more sophisticated work than a pamphlet of collectivism. According 
to them, Lippmann, rather than merely upholding collectivism at the 
expense of liberalism, carefully drew up a blueprint for a society in 
which collectivism can be achieved without abandoning liberalism 
entirely. Renowned intellectual historian David A. Hollinger interprets 
Drift and Mastery as an ambitious work, in which Lippmann pursued 
both “the revolt against formalism” and “the search for order.” 
“Nowhere,” Hollinger maintains, “is the antagonism toward stasis, 
doctrine, and absolutism more intense than in Drift and Mastery, and 
nowhere is the yearning for control and organization more real.” In 
short, Lippmann tried to reconcile “the conflicting desires for 
authority and order,” and “for liberation and flexibility.”5)
regarded the rise of corporations as a sign of the end of classical capitalism and 
presented a new vision of society which is based on the social self or the 
collective identity, not on the self-sufficient individualism.
5) David A. Hollinger, “Science and Anarchy: Walter Lippmann’s Drift and 
Mastery” in In the American Province\(Baltimore, 1989), 55, 45. See also James 
T. Kloppneberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in 
European and American Thought, 1870-1920 (New York, 1986). It still remains 
the most comprehensive sketch on the intellectual affinity between progressivism 
and pragmatism. For the work which focuses on the trajectory of Lippmann’s 
thought, sharing Kloppenberg’s perspective, see Barry D. Riccio, Walter 
Lippmann: Odyssey of a Liberal (New Brunswick, 1994); see also George 
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If there was a fundamental tension between desires for order and 
for liberation in Drift and Mastery, as Hollinger ably shows, then 
where did the desire for liberation come from? As for the desire for 
order, one of the abovementioned two conflicting ideals, it might be 
a natural product of Lippmann’s concern for chaos. Given the fact 
that he announced the battle of progressive reformers should be laid 
against chaos, it is hardly surprising that Lippmann tried to establish 
some order. But as for liberation, it was quite a different story. 
Liberation from something, by definition, inevitably accompanies a 
kind of revolt against the established order. Why did Lippmann 
attempt to reconcile the tension between order and liberation, rather 
than denouncing liberation thoroughly? In other words, why did he 
struggle to establish a new collectivist order within, not out of, 
liberalism, which he termed “a period of drift and doubt?”
To answer these questions, I argue, we should be aware of the 
simple fact that Drift and Mastery is not Lippmann’s first book. 
Rather, it is his 1913 book titled A Preface to Politics. In the book, 
Lippmann primarily emphasized the need for liberation from the 
established order.6) Surely, some students already pointed out 
Lippmann’s desire for liberation. Political scientist Heinz Eulau 
Cotkin, “Middle-Ground Pragmatists: The Popularization of Philosophy in 
American Culture,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 55, no. 2 (Apr. 1994), 
283-302; James Livinsgton, “The Politics of Pragmatism,” Social Text, no. 49 
(Winter 1996), 149-172; about the terms of revolt and order, see Morton White, 
Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (1947; reprint, 
Boston, 1957); Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York, 
1967).
6) Lippmann, A Preface to Politics (1913; reprint, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1962).
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described A Preface to Politics as “a protest against the empty 
formalism and legalism of traditional political science”7) However, 
although there are many studies that consider Lippmann’s debut book 
from their own perspectives, it can hardly be said that the 
implication of the book has been fully investigated. Most of the 
studies are more interested in the continuity or similarity between A 
Preface to Politics and Drift and Mastery than their differences. 
These two books are frequently categorized together under the names 
of “the age of youthful optimism,” Lippmann’s “psychological phase,” 
or more plainly, his progressive era’s works.8)
This article is an effort to explore an important but not yet 
sufficiently explained field in the progressive era’s intellectual history. 
Challenging the past studies which portrayed Lippmann as a corporate 
liberal or a collectivist-oriented thinker, it tries to offer a more 
complex picture of his progressive thought. To do so, it examines the 
7) Heinz Eulau, “Mover and Shaker: Walter Lippmann as a Young Man,” Antioch 
Review 11, no. 3 (Sept. 1951), 298. He is a harsh critic of Lippmann. See also 
idem, “Man against Himself: Walter Lippmann’s Years of Doubt,” American 
Quarterly 4, no. 4 (Winter 1952), 291-304; idem, “Wilsonian Idealist: Walter 
Lippmann Goes to War,” Antioch Review 14, no. 1 (Mar. 1954), 87-108; idem, 
“From Public Opinion to Public Philosophy: Walter Lippmann’s Classic 
Reexamined,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 15, no. 4 (Jul. 
1956), 439-451.
8) “The age of youthful optimism,” see Benjamin F. Wright, 5 Public Philosophies 
of Walter Lippmann, (Austin, 1973), ch. 1; James Hoops sorts Lippmann’s 
intellectual career into three distinctive phases: “the psychological phase” until 
the world war I, “the epistemological phase” of the 1920s, and finally “the 
metaphysical phase” from 1929; see Hoopes, Community Denied: The Wrong 
turn of Pragmatic Liberalism (Ithaca, 1998) ch. 5; Surely, there are some 
notable exceptions to this line of historiography. See Charles Forcey, The 
Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and the Progressive Era, 
1900-1925 (New York, 1961).
 From Revolt to Order   233
implication of A Preface to Politics at first, and then compares the 
book with Drift and Mastery. By giving adequate consideration on 
the similarities and differences between those two books, this article 
demonstrates both the protean and coherent nature of Lippmann’s 
progressivism. Lastly, this article attempts to situate Lippmann’s 
progressivism within its intellectual lineage. Lippmann’s persistent 
effort to reconcile order and freedom may show that many 
intellectual elements of his later thought, especially that his advocacy 
of individual freedom was not a complete contrast to the nature of 
his progressive era’s works.9) The close analysis on the how desire 
for order and for liberation interacted in Lippmann’s thought in the 
progressive era, I hope, may throw some new light on the 
historiography of Lippmann’s intellectual journey.10)
Ⅱ. Revolt against Tradition
In the 1910s, when Lippmann began his career as a progressive 
9) Lippmann’s hope for collectivism presented a striking contrast with the 
characteristic of his later thought, which is well known for its strong advocacy 
of individualist or anti-statist version of liberalism. About his later thought see 
Lippmann, An Inquiry into the Principles of The Good Society (1973; reprint, 
Connecticut, 1973); idem., Essays in the public philosophy (New York, 1955); 
see also Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinvention Free Markets since 
the Depression (Harvard University Press, 2012).
10) More on Lippmann’s position in the American intellectual history, see William 
E. Leuchtenburg, “Walter Lippmann’s Drift and Mastery,” in Walter Lippmann, 
Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest (1914; reprint. 
N.J.: Englewood Cliffs, 1961); a valuable biographical work on Lippmann’s 
entire career, see Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century 
(1980; reprint, New Brunswick, 1998).
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thinker, the United States was at the crossroad of political, economic, 
cultural, and intellectual transition. During the late 19th and early 20th 
century, witnessing the ascendancy of huge corporations and large 
interest groups, Americans came to know that they lived in a totally 
different capitalist society from what Adam Smith in the 18th century 
had imagined. Corporate capitalism, the new form of capitalism based 
upon a new set of principles such as organization, administration, and 
management, eroded the fundamental principles of classical liberalism 
including competition, individual independence, and private property. 
To handle the unfamiliar economic system, a group of intellectuals, 
who associated under the banner of progressivism, entered into the 
political realm.11) The greatest challenge for the progressives was the 
entrenched American liberal tradition. For example, Political theorist 
Louis Hartz describes American history as a triumphal story of 
Lockian liberalism. “This fixed, dogmatic liberalism of a liberal way 
11) An excellent overview on the meanings of progressivism, see Daniel Rodgers, 
“In Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in American History 10, no. 4, (Dec., 
1982), 113-132; see also David M. Kennedy, “Overview: The Progressive Era,” 
Historian, 37, no.3 (May 1975), 453-468; Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: 
the Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920 (New 
York, 2003). In the progressive era, the adjectives ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ 
became used to refer reformers who criticized the Gilded Age’s culture and 
thought, such as Victorian morality, laissez-faire capitalism, and William Graham 
Sumner’s social Darwinism. The ‘intellectual,’ a neologism coined by Emil Zola 
in the fuss of Dreyfus affair, attained a political meaning in the late 19th 
century. According to William James, who introduced the neologism into the 
American lexicon, the intellectual is an educator who presents a vision of new 
society and guides the public onto the road to the new society. See Bender, 
New York Intellectual: a History of Intellectual Life in New York City, from 
1750 to the Beginnings of Our Own Time (Baltimore, 1988). A narrative on 
how liberals and radicals associated with each other, see Doug Rossinow, Vision 
of Progress: the Left-Liberal Tradition in America (Philadelphia, 2008).
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of life,” he asserts, and dominated the entire American political 
thought.12) Given the existence of this die-hard liberal tradition, 
although Americans became aware the advantage of collectivism, it is 
hard to suppose that Americans would surrender liberalism for the 
sake of collectivism. The only remaining option to the progressive 
intellectuals is to grope toward a middle course between chaotic 
liberalism and coercive collectivism. Therefore, they tried to remold 
liberalism from its old, classical, and laissez-faire version into new, 
social and reform liberalism, rather than discarding liberalism 
altogether.13)
What was the strategy of progressive intellectual to go through the 
middle way between between collectivism and liberalism? James T. 
Kloppenberg, Harvard intellectual historian, demonstrates that 
American pragmatism provided a philosophical ground for the 
progressives. According to Kloppenberg, discarding accepted 
distinction “between revolutionary socialism and laissez-faire 
liberalism in politics,” both the European and American progressives, 
such as Max Weber, Leonhard T. Hobhouse, and John Dewey 
12) Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (1955; reprint, New York, 1991), 
9. Hartz argues that there were no feudalism or true revolution in American 
history, and therefore neither reactionary nor revolutionary could develop their 
own ideology. The term of ‘Lockian’ liberalism infers that Americans 
appropriate as well as revere John Locke’s ideals such as property rights and 
rugged individualism. A criticism on Hartz’s liberal tradition, see Kloppenberg, 
“In Retrospect: Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America,” Reviews in 
American History 29, no. 3, (Sep., 2001); Rogers M. Smith. “Beyond 
Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America,” The 
American Political Science Review 87, no. 3. (Sep., 1993).
13) The transformation of liberalism in the early 20th century, see Forcey, The 
Crossroad of Liberalism; About a broader sketch, see Eric Foner, The Story of 
American Freedom (New York, 1999).
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“conversed toward a via media in philosophy and toward the political 
theories of social democracy and progressivism.” Rather than 
depending on a certain ideological dogma, they employed the concept 
of hypothesis on a social issue, examined it through experience, and 
tried to resolve the tension between collectivism and liberalism.14) 
William James, the founder of pragmatism, led Lippmann into this 
progressive-pragmatist camp. During Lippmann’s Harvard years, James 
taught him to focus on reality, experience and power, rather than 
sticking to eternal truths or fixed principles. Following James’s 
lessons, Lippmann came to agree on the maxim of pragmatism that 
“treats even its most firmly established conclusions as the most 
unstable of hypotheses.”15)
Given the fact that Lippmann himself characterized A Preface to 
14) Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory, 3; More on the intellectual affinity between 
progressivism and pragmatism, see Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and 
American Democracy (Ithaca, 1991); Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American 
Social Science (Cambridge; New York, 1991), Part III-IV; Andrew Feffer, The 
Chicago Pragmatists and American Progressivism (New York, 1993). Cornel 
West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism 
(Wisconsin, 1989); Casey N. Blake, Beloved Community: the Cultural Criticism 
of Randolph Bourne, Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo Frank & Lewis Mumford 
(Chapel Hill, 1990); Louis Menand, The Meta Physical Club (1st paperback ed. 
New York, 2002); John P. Diggins lists the contested virtues that Lippmann 
sought to in the 1910s: “disinterestedness and commitment, reason and 
imagination, spontaneity and efficiency, rules and purposes, discipline and desire, 
and, above all, authority and freedom.” John P. Diggins, The Promise of 
Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority (Chicago, 
1994), 325.
15) About James’ philosophical influences on Lippmann, see Ruth Anna 
Putnam(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to William James (Cambridge, 1997), 
322-330; Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory, 318. It is said that Wallas’s elitist 
reformism was most clearly revealed from Drift and Mastery, and Santayana’s 
cosmopolitanism and skepticism stood out from the 1920s.
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Politics, as a study on “James’s idea of uncertainty,” it is undeniable 
that the philosophical leitmotif of the book came from Jamesian 
pragmatism. Compared to his later works, however, A Preface to 
Politics had a distinctive feature that past studies have overlooked. 
Here, Lippmann argued that the task to establish a new order would 
be possible only after achieving liberation from the old order. It was 
quite different from Drift and Mastery in which Lippmann devoted 
almost entire pages to articulate a blueprint of new order. If the 
battle of his 1914 book did not lie against old prejudice “but against 
the chaos of a new freedom,” that of A Preface to Politics primarily 
lied against the old prejudice, i.e. deep-rooted liberal tradition.16)
In the first part of the book (chs. 1-3), Lippmann’s intellectual 
guides were neither James, nor other Harvard professors who had a 
huge effect on him, such as George Santayana and Graham Wallas. 
Rather, the guides were Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, and Karl 
Marx; thinkers more often called liberators than reformers. Among 
the three, Nietzsche’s influences stands out first. In the initial chapter, 
titled “Routineer and Invertor,” applying Nietzsche’s critique of the 
foundationalism, Lippmann urges for liberation from the traditional 
morality. The followers of traditional moral principles, or “the 
routineers,” indiscriminately applied simple dichotomy between good 
and evil on every political issue. For Lippmann, however, it is “the 
greatest American superstition.” He believes that destruction of such 
dichotomy is the precondition to understanding the true meaning of 
politics. “Politics,” he states, “does not exist for the sake of 
16) Lippmann, A Preface to Politics.
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demonstrating the superior righteousness of anybody. … In fact, 
before you can begin to think about politics at all you have to 
abandon the notion that there is a war between good men and bad 
men.” In other words, “there is no way of establishing any clear-cut 
difference in politics between the angels and the imps.” To defy the 
absolute moral principle, Lippmann, revealing his strong inclination to 
Theodore Roosevelt, emphasizes the role of creative individual 
politician, or “the political inventor.” The inventor, Lippmann’s own 
Übermensch, denies the notion that institutions, systems or principles 
have intrinsic virtues, and treats them as mere instruments of human 
purposes. Politicians should serve “the ideals of human feelings, not 
the tendencies of mechanical things.” Like Nietzsche harshly 
condemned “slave morality” because it weighed good or evil actions 
solely based on its intention, and proposed new morality which 
considered the consequences of actions, Lippmann clearly sets forth 
the idea that before building a new order which is supposed to serve 
the purposes of human, it needed that liberation from old morality. 
As intellectual historian Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen well argues, 
Nietzsche’s anti-foundationalism guided Lippmann to take part in the 
early 20th-century intellectual current of “revolt against formalism.”17)
Lippmann’s hostility to old morality, leads him to attack Freud’s 
most hated enemy, taboo. In the chapter titled “The Taboo,” he 
delves into the question of human nature. After characterizing the 
taboo as “the emptiest of all the impositions from on top,” Lippmann 
17) Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 7-8. About Nietzsche’s influences on American 
intellectuals including, see Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, American Nietzsche: A 
History of an Icon and His Ideas (Chicago, 2011), especially on Lippmann, see 
chs. 4-5. 
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argues that someone who most stubbornly clings to the taboo and, by 
doing so, most persistently represses the expression of human 
impulses is none other than the routineer.
The routineer is the first to decry every radical proposal as ‘against 
human nature.’ But the stand-pat mind has forfeited all right to speak for 
human nature. It has devoted the centuries to torturing men’s instincts, 
stamping on them, passing law against them, lifting its eyebrows at the 
thought of them -doing everything but trying to understand them.
Instead of repressing all the impulses, Lippmann recommends that 
politicians “must deal with actual people.” Demanding the “new 
political philosophy” that serves actual people, Lippmann has in 
mind, as we shall see, is Jamesian pragmatism. But the task of 
searching for new order should be waited until liberation from the 
old taboos is accomplished. Like the earlier chapter, the structure of 
this chapter clearly reveals the sequences of Lippmann’s plan: 
liberation first and order next.18)
In the following chapters, Marx, the last of the three liberators, 
steps in. The influence of Marx on Lippmann is never 
straightforward. In fact, Lippmann’s comments on Marx and, 
especially, “Marxian” socialism are generally critical. But still, 
considering the fact that Lipmann once was the first president of 
newly-born Harvard Socialist Club, it can be easily expected that 
Marxist criticism of the laissez-faire liberalism is quite a familiar 
18) Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 34-35. Because of this book, Freud actually 
invited Lippmann to Austria.
About Freud’s influences on Lippmann, see Steel, Walter Lippmann, 45-50.
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topic for him. Before directly attacking the laissez-faire liberalism, 
Lippmann begins the chapter with deploring what he considers the 
problem of his times: the absence of political philosophy. 
The revolutionists who see the misery of the country as a deliberate and 
fiendish plot overestimate the bad will, the intelligence and the singleness of 
purpose in the ruling class. Business and political leaders don’t mean badly; 
the trouble with them is that most of the time they don’t mean anything.
Lippmann argues that the absence of political philosophy originated 
from the blind faith to profit motive. The faith to profit motive 
discourages people to articulate a more complex political philosophy, 
because its believers often regard it as a panacea for every political 
issue. At this point, Lippmann harshly denounces dogmatic 
laissez-faire theorists as follows: “We have actually pretended that the 
work of extracting a living from nature could be done most 
successfully by shortsighted money-makers encouraged by money- 
spending wives.” In other words, the profit motive is the foundation 
of laissez-faire capitalism, and also it has hindered the effort to 
promote “the civilizing possibilities of a new set of motives in 
business.” Like the previous chapters, here Lippmann relies on 
James’s pragmatism and Wallas’s Fabian socialism to establish a 
more civilized order. But still, it is definite that the new civilized 
order is possible only after most Americans are “released from a 
stupid fixation upon the silly little ideals of accumulating dollars and 
filling their neighbor’s eye.”19)
19) Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 45-46, 49. The socialism that Lippmann 
pursued in the Harvard years was a kind of pragmatist version socialism. A 
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In this regard, until when Lippmann wrote A Preface to Politics, 
he took part in the intellectual current that Morton White terms 
“revolt against formalism.” Even though White excludes Lippmann 
from that current mainly due to his later thought that revealed the 
strong advocacy to natural right, higher law and individualism, we 
should not oversee the fact that Lippmann began his career as a 
thinker who cried for liberation from tradition.20) At the end of the 
first part of the book, Lippmann most clearly expresses his desire for 
liberation.
The old effort was to harness mankind to abstract principles--liberty, 
justice or equality--and to deduce institutions from these high-sounding 
words. It did not succeed because human nature was contrary and restive. 
The new effort proposes to fit creeds and institutions to the wants of men, 
to satisfy their impulses as fully and beneficially as possible.21)
In A Preface to Politics, especially in the first part of the book, 
Lippmann shows an open hostility to conventional morality, to 
repression of human impulses, and to the laissez-faire capitalism. And 
that is why historian Henry F. May depicts A Preface to Politics as 
“the most smashing blow yet received by American progressivism of 
study that favorably esteems pragmatist version of socialism as a middle way 
between the naïve revolutionary and the fatalist evolutionary, see Mark Pittenger, 
“Science, Culture and the New Socialist Intellectuals before World War I,” 
American Studies 28 (Spring, 1987), 73-91; see also Riccio, Walter Lippmann: 
Odyssey of a Liberal, ch. 1.
20) White, Social Thought in America; White describes Lippmann as a typical 
dissenter to the intellectual current of revolt against formalism, mainly due to 
Lippmann’s 1955 book, The Public Philosophy; White’s treatment on Lippmann, 
see his long Epilogue of 1957 edition of Social Thought in America.
21) Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 84.
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the dominant variety.”22)
Lipmann, of course, never stops here. Liberation is not the end of 
the story, however significant it may be. In fact, it is the beginning 
of the story in his more ambitious plan for new order. Ironically, the 
first step to search for a new order is to understand the simple fact 
that the fall of traditional order might cause its own problems. If 
there is no the universal morality of any kind, how can we sort out 
good from evil? If there is no such thing as tradition, what would be 
a principle on which our political decisions are based? To answer 
such questions, Lippmann suggests, citing James’s concept of “a 
moral equivalent of war,” to find out the moral equivalent of evil. 
“Instead of tabooing our impulses,” he states, “we must redirect 
them. Instead of trying to crush badness we must turn the power 
behind it to good account.” It is the new political philosophy that 
focuses not on repression of evil but on expression of good. The 
progressive reformer, Lippmann warns, will fail, unless he can invent 
“something which substitutes attractive virtues for attractive vices.”23)
Here, Lippmann directly goes to pragmatism. To find “a moral 
equivalent to evil” or in other words, to formulate new political 
philosophy without absolute foundation, he employs the essential 
concept of pragmatism, hypothesis. Lippmann persuades the readers 
22) Henry F. May, The End of American Innocence; a Study of the First Years of 
Our Own Time, 1912-1917, (1959; reprint, Chicago, 1964), 320; May regards 
the mainstream American progressives shared many feature with the old 
dominant American culture. See also Forcey, The Crossroad of Liberalism, ch. 
3; Eulau, “Mover and Shaker: Walter Lippmann as a Young Man;” Leon Fink, 
Progressive Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Democratic Commitment 
(Cambridge, 1997), ch., 1.
23) Lippmann, A Preface to Politics, 39-40, 42.
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that instead of wasting time to scout around for an absolute 
foundation which restricts every human impulse, they should 
formulate a good hypothesis, whenever they come to political issues.
There is, of course, no infallible touchstone by which we can tell 
offhand. No one need hope for an easy certainty either here or anywhere 
else in human affairs. No one is absolved from experiment and constant 
revision. Yet there are some hypotheses that prima facie deserve more 
attention than others.24)
Here, Hypothesis is applied as an instrument to liberate human 
impulses from the traditional morality and abstract principles.
A particularly arresting feature of A Preface to Politics is that 
Lippmann constantly uses the concept of hypothesis in the following 
chapters, which have a very different implication from the previous 
chapters. While he devotes the first part of book calling for liberation 
of man from the tradition, in the second part (chs. 4-6), Lippmann 
concentrates his attention on human epistemological limitations. The 
epistemological condition of modern America that a liberated man 
had to be faced with was highly unfavorable to him. Lippmann says 
as follows:
The distance between what we know and what we need to know appears 
to be greater than ever. Plato and Aristotle thought in terms of ten thousand 
homogeneous villagers; we have to think in terms of a hundred million 
people of all races and all traditions.
24) Ibid., 53.
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To overcome this epistemological gap between “what we know and 
what we need to know,” Lippmann presents a kind of epistemological 
vessels, such as abstraction, generalization, theories and symbols. 
“Between us and the realities of social life, we build up a mass of 
generalizations, abstract ideas, ancient glories, and personal wishes. 
They simplify and soften experience.” By doing so, men can perceive 
a complex modern society as a simpler one. But the problem is that 
such epistemological vessels frequently distort the realities themselves. 
Clinging to concepts like liberty, equality or justice, men too often 
ignore “the realities of social life” reflected by these concepts. “We 
decide beforehand that things must fit a few preconceived ideas. And 
when they don’t, which is most of the time, we deny truth, falsify 
facts, and prefer the coddling of our theory to any deeper 
understanding of the real problem before us.” Men can neither 
understand the world as a whole nor accept the world as it is.25)
What Lippmann suggests to resolve tension between the desire for 
liberation and the awareness of human epistemological limitations is 
the concept of hypothesis. The modern Americans who are faced 
with such a big and complex society should understand that 
knowledge and action are indispensable to each other. According to 
Lippmann, if every American is fully aware of the fact, then he is 
able to employ his own hypothesis as a guide of action, and it may 
allow him, in spite of his fallibility and limitation, to explore the 
strange modern world.
25) Ibid., 82, 129.
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We have to act on what we believe, on half-knowledge, illusion and 
error. Experience itself will reveal our mistakes; research and criticism may 
convert them into wisdom. … Conduct and theory react upon each other. 
Hypothesis is confirmed and modified by action, and action is guided by 
hypothesis.26) (Emphasis is mine.)
As the paragraph clearly shows, the concept of hypothesis, a 
mixture of personal belief, half-knowledge, illusion, and error, is an 
imperfect, but still indispensable tool to acquire wisdom. Lippmann 
believes that modern Americans are able to have some wisdom 
through thorough experience, research, and criticism. Here the theory 
proves its own significance. Theories, according to him, are not a 
panacea to solve all the social problems at once. They are “much 
more like village lamp-posts than they are like the sun, that they 
were made to light up a particular path, obviate certain dangers, and 
aid a peculiar mode of life.” However, 
if the thinker sees at all deeply into the life of his own time his 
theoretical system will rest upon observation of human nature. That remains 
as a residue of wisdom long after his reasoning and his concrete program 
have passed into limbo. … Wisdom remains; theory passes.
Whereas theory is a hypothesis which stands on limited knowledge, 
wisdom is the universal virtue that all individuals should learn by 
examining the hypothesis through experiences in “the realities of 
social life.” And by applying that wisdom, the new order that 
Lippmann imagines will be established.27)
26) Ibid., 84.
27) Ibid., 158-9; see also Lippmann’s mention on the ability of “political inventor,” 
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The new order is collectivism. In the later part of book (chs. 7-9), 
Lippmann, employing the concepts of wisdom and hypothesis, 
proposes a collectivist political system to deal with the ascendency of 
corporate capitalism. By entering to the debate over collectivism, he 
urges to rearrange the structure of American politics from the 
two-major-party system into a collectivist one. “The break-up of the 
parties into expressive groups would be a ventilation of our national 
life. … The false bonds are best broken: with their collapse would 
come a release of social energy into political discussion.” For 
Lippmann, the two-party system is one of the most rigid old order, 
and it thwarts all the constructive efforts to introduce new older. 
The rigidity of the two-party system is disastrous: it ignores issues 
without settling them, dulls and wastes the energies of active groups, and 
chokes off the protests which should find a civilized expression in public 
life.
For Lippmann, collectivism, a political practice which encourages 
individuals to unite each other into groups, and allows them to 
influence political issues by backing of the power of their own 
groups, is the alternative to old and rigid the American two-party 
system.28)
The fundamental reason Lippmann supports collectivism is his 
awareness of human epistemological limitation. He assumes that 
individual’s range of attention is inevitably too narrow to cover the 
extremely diverse issues in modern society. “We are not all 
77-78.
28) Ibid., 198-9.
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immediately interested in all problems,” he maintains, “our attention 
wanders unless the people who are interested compel us to listen.” 
There is no party that properly represents the whole nation simply 
because that no party-platform fully satisfies “rich and poor, black 
and white, Eastern creditor and Western farmer” at the same time. 
A party that tried to answer every conflicting interest would stand still 
because people were pulling in so many different directions. … One 
comprehensive party platform fusing every interest is impossible and 
undesirable. What is both possible and desirable is that every group interest 
should be represented in public life.29)
If the role of groups in politics cannot be ignored any longer and 
modern men have to live with these groups, they should have their 
own hypotheses. In order to establish new order among the 
entrenched interest groups, the only thing that men can do is to 
understand every opinion, which is inescapably affected by special 
interests, not as an evident truth, but as an unstable hypothesis, and 
through social experiences to learn some wisdom that allows them to 
distinguish the better hypothesis from the worse. 
This is the way of establishing a new order in the absence of 
traditional morality and old ideology. In other words, this is the 
wisdom of American pragmatism. At the end of A Preface to 
Politics, Lippmann adeptly summed up the core of wisdom as 
follows: “There is no such thing as Democracy; there are a number 
of more or less democratic experiments which are not subject to 
29) Ibid., 209, 217.
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wholesale eulogy or condemnation.” Lippmann, as Kloppenberg 
properly describes, agreed that “just as scientists must collectively 
distinguish between true and false hypotheses, so societies must 
distinguish between true and false ideas.” In 1913, Lippmann 
considered democracy as an endless process of verifying multiple 
hypotheses. And it was the process of making the new order that 
Lippmann imagined.30)
Before going on the next chapter of this article, it deserves to be 
mentioned that Lippmann constantly called for liberation from the 
yoke of tradition in A Preface to Politics. He was sharply aware that 
his contemporary Americans at the historical turning point of 
tradition-to-modern. “We live in a revolutionary period,” Lippmann 
states, “and nothing is so important as to be aware of it.” Truly, 
Lippmann’s age is “a revolutionary period.” However, he also firmly 
believed that the revolution was still uncompleted. The last sentences 
of the book allude to Lippmann’s deep concern about it. “If men 
remain slaves either to ideas or to other men, it will be because they 
do not know they are slaves. Their intention is to be free.” For 
Lippmann, liberation from the tradition was not yet accomplished in 
1913.
30) Ibid., 220; Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory, 384; see also Lippmann, “And 
Congress,” (10 March 1917) New Republic in Early Writings, ed. Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. (New York, 1970), 151.
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Ⅲ. Mastering the Great Society
The year of Drift and Mastery came out, it was a critical turning 
point for Lippmann’s progressive thought. During just one year 
between 1913 and 1914, Lippmann drastically grew away from one 
branch of progressivism that emphasized liberation from the tradition, 
and, as he confided to his diary, came to find “less and less 
sympathy with the revolutionists and increasing interest in 
administrative problems.” Lippmann concisely depicted this turn as 
such: “I come definitely nearer to the Progressives.”31) Using the 
term of progressives, he referred to a specific faction of the 
progressives who associated around former U.S. President Theodore 
Roosevelt and called themselves the New Nationalists. Roosevelt and 
the New Nationalists who put together the Progressive Party in 1912, 
believed that only a powerful government, by guaranteeing social 
justice and regulating economic exploitation, was able to achieve 
public welfare. Herbert Croly, a prime intellectual architect of the 
New Nationalism, elegantly presented the goal and the method of the 
New Nationalism: it was a political philosophy that adopted 
Hamiltonian means to achieve Jeffersonian end.32)
The political philosophy which sustained whole intellectual edifice 
of Drift and Mastery was the New Nationalism. In 1914, Lippmann, 
then only a twenty-five-year-old young man, was already one of key 
figures among the New Nationalists. If A Preface to Politics had 
31) Lippmann wrote in his diary that “the winter of 1914 is an important change 
for me.” See Steel, Walter Lippmann, 79.
32) Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (1909; reprint, Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
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made Lippmann as a wunderkind of the progressive camp, Drift and 
Mastery made him as a kind of superstar of the New Nationalist 
intellectuals. Even Theodore Roosevelt himself praised Drift and 
Mastery as follows: “No man who wishes seriously to study our 
present social, industrial and political life can afford not to read it 
through and through and ponder and digest it.”33) Many intellectual 
historians share this mode of appraisal. For example, Hollinger 
recognizes that Lippmann’s Drift and Mastery is “in any event, right 
in the middle of ‘progressive social thought’ by almost everyone’s 
reckoning.” In short, it can be adequately said that very few books 
attracted more attention both from his contemporary progressive 
intellectuals and the historians of progressivism than Lippmann’s 1914 
magnum opus.34)
Among many other eulogistic comments on Drift and Mastery, 
Randolph Bourne, one of intellectual leaders of the Young Americans 
in the 1910s, provided the most valuable one that touched the heart 
of the book. It is “a book one would have given one’s soul to have 
written,” Borne wrote, it deals with “what to do with your 
emancipation after you have got it.”35) At 1914, Lippmann, as Bourn 
noticed, was no longer interested in such things as emancipation, 
33) Roosevelt’s comments quoted in Steel, Walter Lippmann, 77-79.
34) Ibid.
35) Bourn’s assessment on Drift and Mastery, see Randolph Bourne, Randolph 
Bourne: The Radical Will, Selected Writings 1911-1918, ed. Olaf Hansen 
(Berkeley, 1992), 20; see also Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in 
America, 1889-1963: the Intellectual as a Social Type (1965; reprint, New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1986). 78; more about the “Young Americans,” see Casey 
Nelson Blake, Beloved Community: the Cultural Criticism of Randolph Bourne, 
Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo Frank, & Lewis Mumford (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1990).
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liberation, and revolt. It never means that Lippmann came to be 
hostile toward the desire for liberation from tradition. Rather, it 
simply means that he believed that liberation already had been fully 
accomplished. In other words, the task of Drift and Mastery was 
different from that of A Preface to Politics. Although most of the 
philosophical premises of the 1913 book, such as the uncertainty of 
truth, human epistemological limitations, and the application of the 
concept of hypothesis in social and political issues, remained intact in 
Drift and Mastery, but a premise that was once crucial in 
Lippmann’s thought certainly faded away. In his new book, 
Lippmann no longer neither feared nor hated deep-rooted tradition. 
On the contrary, what he concerned with was the fate of modern 
American who was thoroughly uprooted from tradition.36)
Indeed, Lippmann begins Drift and Mastery by clarifying that 
liberation from the traditional order is not what should be achieved 
in the future but the condition already given. “If we flounder,” he 
maintains, “it is not because the old order is strong, but because the 
new one is weak.” Thus the issues that modern Americans faced are 
inevitably “very different from those of the last century and a half.” 
Lippmann lucidly sums up the issues as follows: 
Those who went before inherited a conservatism and overthrew it; we 
inherit freedom, and have to use it. The sanctity of property, the patriarchal 
family, hereditary caste, the dogma of sin, obedience to authority, -the rock 
of the ages, in brief, has been blasted for us. Those who are young today 
are born into a world in which the foundations of the older order survive 
36) Lippmann, Drift and Mastery; 
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only as habits or by default. So Americans can carry through their purposes 
when they have them.37)
Such insight that old order was already in demise leads Lippmann 
to a very different path from that he has walked on so far. The 
single most noticeable aspect in the first part of Drift and Mastery 
(chs. 1-7) is the fact that Lippmann casts the muckrakers and the 
populists as his two main villains. Whereas “the routineer,” the prime 
target of his criticism in A Preface to Politics, were the defender of 
old order, the muckrakers and the populists are, after all, honest 
reformers. In other words, if the rootineer thwarted the reformist 
efforts to build a new order “from above,”, Lippmann’s new villains, 
quite contrastingly, by distilling complex problems of modern society 
into simpler ones, mislead and pervert reformist energy “from 
below.”
Lippmann, as himself was once an apprentice to Lincoln Steffens, 
one of the most influential writers in the muckraker movement, well 
knows the limitations of the movement. He accuses the muckrakers 
that they routinely overstated the government’s negative aspects, 
especially corruptions of the machine politics, while ignoring its 
positive roles in modern society, such as protecting its people from 
economic tyranny and maintaining democratic order. However, at the 
opening of the 20th century, Lippmann argues, “democratic people 
had begun to see much greater possibilities in the government than 
ever before.” In the same vein, he continues his criticism toward 
populists who indiscriminately dismissed the trust movement. 
37) Ibid., xvi, xxii-xxiii.
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Opposing populists, most notably William Jennings Bryan who 
demanded breaking up all the trusts, Lippmann asserts that “the trusts 
are organizing private property out of existence, are altering its nature 
so radically that very little remains but the title and the ancient 
theory.” He believes that there is no fundamental difference between 
conservatives who blindly cherished the myth of profit motive and 
the populists who retrospectively longed for another myth of 
independent yeomen and small local communities that were supposed 
to once have existed in traditional American society. In short, neither 
the muckrakers, nor the populists realized the significance of trust 
movement in the 20th century United States.38) 
In contrast to these backward looking reformers, Lippmann 
understands the ascendancy of collectivism as a general and 
irresistible trend of his times. Therefore, his main concern is not 
liberation from the old order, which was accomplished by the trust 
movement.39) In Drift and Mastery, Lippmann firmly focuses his 
attention on the question of how to make the trust movement coexist 
with democracy, instead of futilely resisting the irresistible trend. In 
other words, “The real problem of collectivism,” Lippmann argues, 
“is the difficulty of combining popular control with administrative 
power.”
38) Ibid., 18-19, 50.
39) Ibid., 50; here, Lippmann mentions as the significance of the trust movement 
that it “is doing what no conspirator or revolutionist could ever do: it is sucking 
the life out of private property.”
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Private property is no part of the issue. For any industry which was 
ready for collectivism would have abolished private property before the 
question arose. What would remain for discussion would be the conflict 
between democracy and centralized authority.
For Lippmann, the issue is clear. How does one resolve the 
conflicts between popular control and administrative power, between 
democracy and centralized authority?40)
In the latter part of Drift and Mastery, Lippmann digs deeper into 
this issue. To resolve the conflicts, according to him, modern 
Americans, first of all, should pay more attention to the gap between 
“a big world and little men.” Lippmann’s awareness of the gap 
reveals the intellectual influence of English Fabian socialist Graham 
Wallas. In his 1914 book, The Great Society, which was dedicated to 
his beloved student, i.e. Lippmann, Wallas portrayed the 
transformation of the social environment from small local 
communities to a big, complex, and impersonal “Great Society.” 
Following Wallas, Lippmann believes that the modern industrial 
society is too big, too complex, and too fleet to fully grasp by men. 
He depicts this condition as follows: “We have changed our 
environment more quickly than we know how to change ourselves.” 
According to Lippmann, the central difficulty of democratic polity 
originated from this epistemological gap between “big word and little 
men.” In other words, it is never an easy task for little men to 
govern themselves in this big, complex and ever-changing society.41)
40) Ibid., 62.
41) Ibid., 189; about relationship between Wallas and Lippmann, see Martin J. 
Wiener, Between Two Worlds: The Political Thought of Graham Wallas (Oxford, 
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At this point, we can notice the fact that Americans faced the 
familiar dilemma that we have seen in A Preface to Politics. The 
exact same people who are supposed to control “centralized 
authority” are under the most unfavorable conditions more than ever. 
For that reason, Lippmann, before presenting the strategy to control 
centralized authority, frankly admits the difficulty of self-government. 
“Men,” Lippmann states, “will do almost anything but govern 
themselves. They don’t want the responsibility. In the main, they are 
looking for some benevolent guardian.” However, Lippmann is well 
aware the fact that there is no such thing as a benevolent guardian. 
Modern men, who are already liberated from the traditional authority 
should deal with everything themselves. Lippmann ably describes the 
destiny of modern men:
We have lost authority. We are ‘emancipated’ from an ordered world. We 
drift. The loss of something outside ourselves which we can obey is a 
revolutionary break with our habits. Never before have we had to rely so 
completely upon ourselves. … It is with emancipation that real tasks begin, 
and liberty is a searching challenge, for it takes away the guardianship of 
the master and the comfort of the priest. The iconoclasts didn’t free us. 
They threw us into the water, and now we have to swim. (Emphasis in 
original)42)
Just like Max Weber termed such “emancipation” as “the 
disenchantment of the world,” Lipmann names it liberalism. “There is 
a great gap between the overthrow of authority and the creation of a 
1971), chap. 6; Robert Frankel, Observing America: Commentary of British 
Visitors to the United States, 1890-1950 (Madison, 2007), 104-8.
42) Ibid., 196-7.
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substitute. That gap is called liberalism: a period of drift and doubt. 
We are in it today.” Both the inevitability and the difficulty of 
democratic self-government is derived from liberalism. Critical spirits, 
a product of modern liberalism, deprived every monumental creed of 
its claim for certainty. After beginning “a period of drift and doubt,” 
all the footholds of traditional authority, such as moral principles, 
religious dogmas, and ideological doctrines, became mere objects of 
human’s criticism. In this respect, it can be said that modern 
liberalism liberated men from traditional authority. But the problem is 
that liberalism, while overthrowing the traditional authority so 
thoroughly, did not teach the liberated men how to live without that 
authority. Modern men are caught between Scylla and Charybdis. 
They are confronted with the following dilemma: liberalism destroyed 
all the traditional authorities which we can simply trust and follow, 
thus self-government become the only principle to be applied when 
establishing a new order, but that very self-government cannot be 
achieved by liberalism alone. Lippmann compares his contemporary 
Americans who face the dilemma to immigrants. 
All of us are immigrants spiritually. We are all of us immigrants in the 
industrial world, and we have no authority to lean upon. We are an 
uprooted people … The modem man is not yet settled in his world. It is 
strange to him, terrifying, alluring, and incomprehensibly big.
When Lippmann designs his plan for new order, as the paragraph 
obviously demonstrates, he has in mind that Americans are uprooted 
from their tradition rather than deep-rooted in it.43)
Although he confesses the difficulty of self-government, we should 
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not equate it with a sign that Lippmann denies the possibility of 
democratic order. Rather he begins to search for a new order directly 
after confessing the difficulty of self-government. To do so, he 
argues, every American should have his own vision for a new order. 
Here, Lippmann, as he did in A Preface to Politics, once again relies 
upon American pragmatism. Indeed, Lippmann uses the term of 
vision as a synonym for the concept of hypothesis. The most 
important role of vision in this book, as well as of hypothesis in A 
Preface to Politics, is that it brings some order out of chaos. In the 
introduction, Lippmann clearly explains how the concept of vision 
works as follows:
We make our vision and hold it ready for any amendment that experience 
suggests. It is not a fixed picture, a row of shiny ideals which we can 
exhibit to mankind, and say: Achieve these or be damned. … it will be a 
human hypothesis, not an oracular revelation. But if the hypothesis is honest 
and alive it should cast a little light upon our chaos.44)
In short, Lippmann understands vision as a kind of provisional 
blueprint for a new order.
43) Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 211.
44) Ibid., xxii-xxiii; Because this paragraph, I think, is the most pivotal section of 
the entire Drift and Mastery, I would like to add the remaining part of the 
paragraph here in the footnote. Lippmann states as follows: “It should help us to 
cease revolving in the mere routine of the present or floating in a private utopia. 
For a vision of latent hope would be woven of vigorous strands; it would be 
concentrated on the crucial points of contemporary life, on the living zone where 
the present is passing into the future. It is the region where thought and action 
count. Too far ahead there is nothing but your dream; just behind, there is 
nothing but your memory. But in the unfolding present, man can be creative if 
his vision is gathered from the promise of actual things.”
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The remaining tasks for progressive intellectuals, Lippmann 
believes, are persuading Americans to have their own visions and 
preparing a more favorable condition to do that. To do so, 
Americans, above all else, should overcome the mortal fear of failure. 
Lippmann asks himself: If every mistake leads to a collapse of 
individual life, who dares to take action solely based on an uncertain 
hypothesis, and who dares to take even one step forward to establish 
a new order according to his own vision? To overcome the fear of 
failure, Lippmann assures the readers that “A mistake matters far less 
than most of us imagine: the world is not brittle, but elastic.” This 
confidence-a mistake would not be fatal-is grounded on the plain 
reality that the United States is the wealthiest country in the world. 
Lippmann thinks that only in the midst of plenty, “the imagination 
becomes ambitious, rebellion against misery is at last justified, and 
dreams have a basis in fact.” In other words, he considers the 
abundance as a necessary condition for achieving self-government, 
and for establishing a new order.
The blunders are not fatal: American wealth has hardly been tapped. And 
that is why America still offers the greatest promise to democracy. The first 
item in the program of self-government is to drag the whole population well 
above the misery line.45)
In Lippmann’s scheme for a new order, self-government and 
abundance, or the principle and the condition of the order, are 
indissolubly linked with each other because the order needs a 
45) Ibid., 249, 253-4.
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standard of living which is high enough to provide for Americans to 
manage trial and error.
After convincing Americans that they live in the blessed land for 
democracy, Lippmann, in the chapter, titled “Mastery,” or what I 
think is the most brilliant part in Drift and Mastery, presents his 
own vision for a new order. He reaffirms that “tradition will not 
work in the complexity of modern life” and “America is 
preeminently the country where there is practical substance in 
Nietzsche’s advice that we should live not for our fatherland but for 
our children’s land.”
To do so this men have to substitute purpose for tradition: that is, I 
believe, the profoundest change that has ever taken place in human history. 
We can no longer treat life as something that has trickled down to us. We 
have to deal with it deliberately, devise its social organization, alter its tools, 
formulate its method, educate and control it. In endless ways we put 
intention where custom has reigned. We break up routines, make decisions, 
choose our ends, select means.46)
Here, we can notice that the messages of A Preface to Politics 
and Drift and Mastery overlap each other. The argument of his 1913 
book that every American should acquire some wisdom through 
experiences is echoed in the message that they have to dispel the 
afraid of failure and resolutely take action to achieve self-government. 
If the wisdom was both the principle of political participation and the 
lesson from it in A Preface to Politics, here mastery is both the 
principle of self-government and the lesson from it. Lippmann defines 
46) Ibid., 265, 266-7.
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the notion of mastery as the method of overcoming chaos -not by 
depending absolute dogmas derived from ideology, religion, or 
morality, but by applying hypotheses. He states as follows:
This is what mastery means: the substitution of conscious intention for 
unconscious striving. Civilization … is just this constant effort to introduce 
plan where there has been clash, and purpose into the jungle of disordered 
growth.47)
Lippmann knows that mastery cannot be achieved at a single 
stroke. It can be achieved, as the paragraph above shows, only 
through the “constant effort to introduce plan.” Therefore, when one 
faces a somewhat different result from what his hypothesis expected, 
he has to modify, amend, or reform his hypothesis rather than 
discarding it entirely. Lippmann advises the readers that “You cannot 
throw your-self blindly against unknown facts and trust to luck that 
the result will be satisfactory.” Rather, they should keep in mind the 
axiom that “you can have misleading ideas, but you cannot escape 
ideas.” If they give up every theory and cease formulating their own 
visions, Lippmann predicts, then “accident becomes the master.” The 
process of employing hypothesis, examining it, and modifying it, 
Lippmann calls that process as science. In other words, the scientific 
spirit is another name for mastery.
Rightly understood science is the culture under which people can live 
forward in the midst of complexity, and treat life not as something given 
but as something to be shaped. … There is nothing accidental then in the 
47) Ibid., 269.
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fact that democracy in politics is the twin-brother of scientific thinking. They 
had to come together. As absolutism falls, science arises. It is 
self-government. For when the impulse which overthrows kings and priests 
and unquestioned creeds becomes self-conscious we call it science. … The 
scientific spirit is the discipline of democracy, the escape from drift, the 
outlook of a freeman.48)
The concept of hypothesis plays the central role in this process. It 
links two fundamental principles of science: specialty and cooperation. 
Little men cannot fully grasp all the aspects of big world, thus they 
should concentrate their attentions and interests on a specific field. 
All American have to be experts in their own specialties. But all 
experts are familiar with only a limited field, therefore, cooperation is 
an indispensible quality for science.
No omnipotent ruler can deal with our world, nor the scattered anarchy 
of individual temperaments. Mastery is inevitably a matter of cooperation, 
which means that a great variety of people working in different ways must 
find some order in their specialties.49)
To relate specialty with cooperation, it is necessary that every 
expert should consider his theory as a provisional hypothesis. “The 
true scientist,” Lippmann states, “is inspired by a vision without 
48) Ibid., 269, 270, 275-6.
49) Ibid., 286; In other articles in the New Republic, Lippmann also shows a similar 
attitude on cooperation. “We do not live in a world where individual genius 
alone matters. We live in a world in which intelligence must be collective, in 
which leadership itself requires a division of labor.” Lippmann, “In the Next 
Four Years” (3 March 1917) in Early Writings, 148; see also idem., “Honor and 
Election Returns” (18 Nov. 1916).
262   Ilnyun Kim 
being the victim of it.” If scientists are ready to modify their own 
hypotheses, then they can participate in a common experiment with 
other scientists cooperatively. This pragmatic attitude is the essence 
of what Lippmann calls scientific spirit.50)
For Lippmann the hypothesis was a conceptual tool of pragmatism 
which equipped little men to govern the great society themselves by 
reconciling the latent tension between the ideal of self-government 
and the tendency of centralization of authority. The collectivism that 
he upheld in the progressive era shared these features. Lippmann was 
influenced by American pragmatism which taught him the lesson that 
treated every opinion as a provisional and tentative hypothesis, thus 
he was able to understand an opinion of corporations or other interest 
groups as one of many hypotheses, and collectivism as just an 
experiment to verify the hypotheses. Lippmann, in other words, 
believed that if interest groups present various opinions, and if people 
regarded the opinions not as an absolute truth but as a mere 
hypothesis, collectivism could be a method to establish a new order 
without violating principles of self-government. In Drift and Mastery, 
Lippmann attempted to search for a more democratic order by 
experimenting collectivism.
Ⅳ. Conclusion
Lippmann’s intellectual journey in the progressive era, as I argue 
in the previous chapters, can be divided into two closely related but 
50) Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 306-7.
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still distinctive phases. In general, his journey in the progressive era 
had begun with revolting against old order and finished with fighting 
against “the chaos of a new freedom.” In A Preface to Politics, 
Lippmann believed that the task to establish a new order is possible 
only after accomplishing liberation from the old order. Thus, 
Lippmann, by referring Nietzsche, Freud, and even Marx, repeatedly 
called for emancipation form the tradition. In this regard, he took 
part in the intellectual current of ‘revolt against formalism’ in 1913. 
Just one year was enough for Lippmann to realize the fact that the 
old order was far weaker than he imagined. In 1914, Lippmann was 
not interested in such things as revolt, liberation, and emancipation. 
He came to think that liberation already had been fully accomplished. 
Lippmann, therefore, devoted the amount of pages of Drift and 
Mastery primarily to search for a new order. The career of 
Lippmann’s progressivism may be delineated as a journey from a 
revolt against an old order to a search for a new order.
Lippmann did not insist that a new order that he pursued would 
provide an absolute, perfect, and eternal principle for liberated 
Americans to follow. Lippmann, as intellectual historian Barry D. 
Riccio properly argues, well knew the fact that “a liberal order was 
the best that fallible men and women could hope for in an imperfect 
world.” In the progressive era, Lippmann, while attempting to 
establish a new order, kept in mind the pragmatist dictum that 
“politics begins and ends in the uncertainty of experience, not in 
abstractions.” In A Preface to Politics as well as Drift and Mastery, 
he pursued at the same time contested virtues, such as 
“disinterestedness and commitment, reason and imagination, 
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spontaneity and efficiency, rules and purposes, discipline and desire, 
and, above all, authority and freedom.”51) Lippmann dispelled 
monumental principles which had been sustained in the old order, 
and never tried to reconstruct such principles. Rather, by applying the 
lesson of pragmatism, he continuously sought to resolve the tension 
between democracy and collectivism, or between the ideal of 
self-government and the tendency of centralization of authority. And 
it was the key to understanding why Lippmann made an effort to 
conciliate desire for order and for liberation.
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Abstract
 




This article is an attempt to reinterpret Lippmann’s progressive thought. 
By comparing his early major work Drift and Mastery (1914) with his debut 
book A Preface to Politics (1913), this article argues that his intellectual 
journey can be divided into two closely related but yet distinctive phases. 
Whereas Lippmann believed in 1913 that the search for a new order should 
be waited until liberation from the old order was fully accomplished, in 
1914 he clearly revealed the belief that the old order was already demised. 
In this regard, this article delineates the career of Lippmann’s progressivism 
as the journey from a revolt against an old order to a search for a new 
order. By tracing his intellectual trajectory of the same era, it also maintains 
that Lippmann’s main object was to resolve a series of tensions between 
desire for liberation and for order, between liberalism and collectivism, and 
between the ideal of self-government and the human epistemological 
limitations. Lippmann, employing the concept of hypothesis, consistently 
struggled with those tensions. By giving a more complex picture on the 
similarities and differences between A Preface to Politics and Drift and 
Mastery, and situating those books within its intellectual lineage, this article 
demonstrates both the protean and coherent nature of Lippmann’s 
progressivism.
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